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Manuel: Administrative Law

Administrative Law
by Wiley W. Manuel*

In the period from October 1967 to October 1968, the
field of administrative law has continued to receive attention
by the appellate courts. In the area of case law the emphasis
in the past year has centered on proceedings held by the
Department of Motor Vehicles arising out of the so-called implied consent law. 1 These cases have resulted in refinements
in the statement of certain constitutional principles, the recognition of newer methods to promote traffic safety, and more
definitive applications of administrative law concepts.
In the field of legislation, although many statutes were
passed affecting administrative agencies, most of the enactments deal with the substantive problems with which par"A.B. 1951 University of California,
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ticular agencies are concerned. As such, they are not proper
subjects for this article, which is intended to give a somewhat
comprehensive review of the developments in administrative
law generally.
The legislature, by enactment of an administrative discovery
bill, and by a reworking of the statutes relating to access to
public records attempted in 1968 to provide methods in the
proper setting for obtaining information from state agencies.
It is in this field of access to information that the legislature
has perhaps had its greatest impact on administrative law
throughout this last year.
Legislation

Administrative Discovery

For a number of years, the question of availability of discovery in administrative law has been open to debate. In an
unreported superior court case, attempts at taking a deposition
of persons complaining to the Real Estate Commissioner were
denied. 2 The Administrative Procedure Ace has clearly provided that depositions are available in administrative proceedings governed by that act,4 only where there is a showing
that a witness sought to be deposed will be unable or cannot
be compelled to attend at the time and place of the hearing,
and accordingly, most attempts at depositions fail.
In the landmark case of Shively v. Stewart,5 the California
Supreme Court had before it a proceeding in mandamus in
which two doctors, accused of performing or arranging for
the abortions of several women, requested the following from
the administrative agency: (1) the statements of the abortees
and their husbands; (2) all statements made by the doctors
in the hands of the Board of Medical Examiners, including
copies of hospital records, billings, etc.; and (3) the investigation reports made by the investigators for the board. The
2. Labat v. Real Estate Commissioner, San Francisco Superior Court
No. 525696.
3. Cal. Government Code §§ 11500
et seq.
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court, noting the existence of discovery in most civil and
criminal practice and the seriousness of the matter, rendered
its decision and order whereby it made available the statements of the abortees and their husbands, and the statements
of the doctors. Curiously enough, in ordering the issuance
of the peremptory writ of mandate, the court confined itself
to the first two categories and did not order the board to make
available a subpoena duces tecum for the latter purpose, commenting that the investigation reports themselves were not
available except on a showing of good cause. Shively also
has been interpreted as not permitting either the taking of
depositions of witnesses or interrogatories of the agency administrators. 6
After Shively, attempts were made to enact administrative
discovery legislation, some codifying Shively, some narrower
and some broader. 7
In 1968, at the early meetings of the Senate Judiciary Committee, the Committee indicated that parties interested in
producing a discovery bill should come together, work out
their differences and give the legislature the benefit of a bill
fully explored by those most interested. Accordingly, throughout the spring of 1968, representatives from the Attorney
General's Office, the State Bar, the Department of Alcoholic
Beverage Control, the Office of Administrative Procedure, and
the Department of Professional and Vocational Standards
met and drafted Senate Bill 833. The bill was produced and
introduced by Senator Stephens from the Senate Judiciary
Committee, and was then enacted as Chapter 808 of the
Statutes of 1968. The law, in essence, is a records discovery
law.
It was realized by all parties participating that perhaps one
of the hallmarks of administrative law is expeditious and
easily understood process. Accordingly, the statute was an
attempt to give the parties to an administrative proceeding
as much information as possible in the simplest possible way.
The information was made available as a matter of right
6. Everett v. Gordon, 266 Cal. App.
2d - , 72 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1968).

7. See Cal Law-Trends and Developments 1967, p. 319.
CAL LAW 1969
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and upon request with no showing of good cause required.
A layman could ask for the information as well as a lawyer,
and since proceedings before administrative agencies may
find respondents unrepresented by council, the bill amended
section 11504 of the Government Code to advise the parties
to the proceedings through the statement to respondent of the
right to discovery and further required that copies of the
pertinent sections of the Government Code embodying the
discovery procedure accompany the statement to respondent.
Section 11507.5 was added by this statute to the Government Code to provide that the discovery law would provide
the exclusive right and method of discovery as to any proceedings governed by that chapter. Obviously, the intent
of the legislature and the authors of the bill was to forestall any
more experimentation in this area and to make it clear that
the legislative procedure was exclusive.
The statute added section 11507.6 to the Government
Code, which section contains the most important provision
of the act. It provides that after the initiation of an administrative proceeding, a party, upon written request made
to any other party prior to the hearing and within 30 days
after service of the initial pleading or within 15 days after
service of any additional pleadings, is entitled (1) to obtain
the names and addresses of witnesses to the extent known by
the other party, including, but not limited to those, intended to
be called to testify at the hearing and (2) to inspect and make
copies of any of the following in the possession or custody or
control of the other parties:
(a) A statement of a person, other than the respondent, named in the initial administrative pleading, or in
any additional pleading, when it is claimed that the
act or omission of the respondent as to such person is
the basis for the administrative proceeding;
(b) A statement pertaining to the subject matter of
the proceeding made by any party to another party or
person;
(c) Statements of witnesses then proposed to be called
by the party and of other persons having personal knowl300
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edge of the acts, admissions or events which are the
basis for the proceeding, not included in (a) or (b)
above;
(d) All writings, including but not limited to reports of mental, physical and blood examinations and
things which the party then proposes to offer in evidence;
(e) Any other writing or thing which is relevant and
which would be admissable in evidence;
(f) Investigative reports made by or on behalf of the
agency or other party pertaining to the subject matter
of the proceeding, to the extent that such reports (1)
contain the names and addresses of witnesses or of persons having personal knowledge of the acts, admissions
or events which are the basis for the proceeding, or (2)
reflect matters perceived by the investigator in the course
of his investigation, or (3) contain or include by attachment any statement or writing described in (a) to (e),
inclusive, or summary thereof.
It may be noted the first class of information subject to inspection, (a) above, embodies the first class of material which
was to be made discoverable by Shively, i.e., the statements
of the abortees and their husbands. Normally we can classify
these people as the victims or persons sought to be protected
by the law. In a disciplinary case involving an action against
a contractor, for example, it would include any statements
made by any of the other contracting parties with whom the
contractor contracted or owed a duty as a contractor. In
the case of a liquor licensee involving serving of liquor
to a minor, it would include the statement of the named
minor.
The statement pertaining to the subject matter of the proceeding made by any party to any other party or person in
(b) above, essentially involves the second class of material
made available in the Shively case and includes the admissions
of the parties. The language of the act is broad enough to
include, in the case of a third party accusation or third party
protest to the issuance of a license, the admissions of the third
CAL LAW 1969
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party, thus allowing the protestants to get the admissions of
the persons seeking the license.
With respect to investigatory reports, the third kind of discoverable material involved in the Shively case, the act intended to make these investigation reports available so long as
they contained matters which were otherwise discoverable
under the other provisions of the act so that the investigation
report may not be a shelter which would keep the matter
hidden. Also, where the investigators were percipient witnesses to the events material to the case, their investigation
reports would be made available to any other witnesses. The
act intended, however, to restrict access to those parts of the
investigation report which were nothing more than opinions
of the investigator, or were analyses of other witnesses. It
was believed that there would be an area of confidence between the investigator and his supervisor and, except to the
extent that the investigation would otherwise cover discoverable material, the investigator should be free to express his
recommendations knowing that his investigation report would
not be the subject of discovery. In this respect, the act recognizes the usual privileges against disclosure, including the
rules involving the attorney's work product.
The matter of enforcement of discovery rights has been
considered. In Shively, the supreme court perhaps, more by
ipse dixit than by sound reasoning, held that the courts provided the best and sole forum to decide discovery rights. In
doing so it completely disregarded the concept of administrative remedies. The framers of the legislation in question
have more or less followed the supreme court's lead, for it
was thought that if there is going to be any controversy over
discovery, it should be quickly resolved. It was further
thought that there probably would be little chance of getting
a bill passed which denied access to the courts prior to the
final adjudication of the case. Accordingly, section 11507.7
was added to the Government Code to provide that a person
who does not get the discovery sought can, within 15 days
after the respondent party first evidenced his failure to comply
or within 30 days after the request for discovery was made
and the party has failed to reply to the request, whichever
302
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period is longer, file in the superior court in the county where
the proceeding is pending, a petition to compel discovery. The
court, if satisfied from the reading of the petition that it sets
forth good cause for relief, must issue an order to show cause
directed to the respondent party; otherwise the court must
enter an order denying the petition. Theoretically, the superior court is charged with the duty to consider the petition
thoughtfully and it is expected that the order to show cause
should not automatically issue merely because the petition
seeks it.
The order to show cause is to be served upon the party
by certified mail, and the order is returnable no earlier than
10 days after the date issued and no later than 30 days after
the filing of the petition. During the time the matter is
pending in the courts, the administrative proceeding is stayed
if a copy of the order to show cause is filed with the Office
of Administrative Procedure forthwith upon issuance. If it
is contended that any matter sought is not discoverable under
the law or is privileged, the court may order the matter filed
for in camera examination by the court. The decision of the
court is not reviewable by appeal, but rather by a mandamus
proceeding in the appellate court.
It is clear that the statute provides the party seeking discovery with the right to obtain tangible matter; but neither
depositions nor interrogatories are available. Because of its
placement these discovery provisions will affect only those
proceedings governed by the Administrative Procedure Act.

Access to Public Records-The California Public
Records Act
Next in importance to the provisions of the administrative
discovery statute are the provisions of Chapter 1473, California Statutes of 1968, regulating access to public records.
This chapter adds section 6250 to 6260 (Chapter 3.5 of
Division 7 of Title 1) to the Government Code and amends
and repeals other provisions of the various codes. The addition to the code is entitled the "California Public Records
Act."
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1969
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The statute defines public records and provides for the
public's right of access to them. Section 6252 is added to the
Code to define state agency, local agency, person and public
records. Public records are defined to include papers, maps,
magnetic or paper tapes, photographic films, prints, magnetic
or punch cards, discs, drums or other documents containing
information relating to the conduct of the public's business
prepared, owned, used or retained by any state or local
agency regardless of physical form or characteristic. Apparently, the statute was looking ahead, not only considering the
printed word but also considering information stored in
memory banks and other apparatus which are part of computerized and data processing systems. The statute, by addition of section 6253 to the Code, makes public records open
to inspection at all times during office hours of the state or local
agency and states further that every citizen has the right to
inspect any public record, except as otherwise provided in
the bill. The agency may, however, adopt regulations stating
the procedures to be followed in making these records available in accordance with the section.
There are certain records which are not required to be disclosed. They follow somewhat expected patterns and are
covered by Government Code section 6254 subsections (a)
through (m).
Subsection (a) precludes disclosure of intra or inter-agency
memoranda not retained by the public agency in the regular
course of business, provided the public interest in withholding
such records fairly outweighs the public interest in disclosure.
Among other matters precluded from disclosure by the
statute are: recordings pertaining to pending litigation; disclosures constituting invasion of personal privacy, such as
medical files; trade secrets; investigations of the Attorney
General's Office and Justice Department; and confidential tax
information, as well as many other matters which by nature
are confidential.
In order for an agency to withhold any of its records, section 6255 of the Code provides that agencies shall demonstrate that the records are exempt under the express provisions
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1969/iss1/13

304

CAL LAW 1969

8

Manuel: Administrative Law

Administrative Law

of the chapter or that on the facts of the particular case, the
public interest served by not making the record public clearly
outweighs the public interest served by disclosure.
Section 6256 provides that any person may receive a copy
of an identifiable public record or shall be provided with a
copy of all information contained therein. Computer data
shall be provided in a form determined by the agency. Section
6257 allows the agency to recoup the cost of making a copy
of an identifiable record or for producing information in the
form of a certified copy of such a record.
A person who is aggrieved by any action of an agency by
withholding the information may, under section 6258, institute proceedings in any court of competent jurisdiction
to enforce the right to receive a copy of the public record.
As in the case of the administrative discovery statute, if
there is a question of the confidentiality or the right to see
the particular document, the court may have the document
presented to it and examine the record in camera if permitted
by subdivision (b) of section 915 of the Evidence Code.
Section 6260 of the Government Code indicates that the provisions of the chapter shall not be deemed to affect in any
manner the status of judicial records as the same existed prior
to the effective date of the section, nor to affect the rights of
litigants, including parties to administrative proceedings, under
the discovery laws of the state.
Treatment of Electronic Data Processing Systems

An area which should be the focus of legislation in the
years to come is that of computers and data processing, given
the great technological advancements prevalent in that area
today.
The legislature really has not fully come to grips with
treating the data processing systems material in the same
way that it has, for example, microfilming. 8 In 1968, the
legislature, by Chapter 1062, amended section 1806 of the
8. Cal. Government Code §§ 12263,
12264.
20
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Vehicle Code and made its first attempt at providing for the
admissibility of information stored in electronic data processing systems by providing as follows:
At its discretion the department may file and maintain
these accident reports and abstracts by electronic recording and storage media and after transcribing electronically all available data from the accident reports
and abstracts of conviction may destroy the original
documents, except in cases where this code requires mandatory action against a person's driving privilege upon
the receipt of such abstracts or reports. Notwithstanding
any other provisions of law, the recorded facts from any
electronic recording and storage device maintained by
the department shall constitute evidence of such facts
in any administrative actions instituted by the department. [Department of Motor Vehicles]
It wiII be interesting to see how this section, although relating to admissibility in administrative proceedings conducted
by the Department of Motor Vehicles only, will operate in
practice, there being very little experience in California at the
present time with regard to the admissibility of data stored
in electronic devices. The method of assuring the authenticity
and completeness of the records should attract the curiosity
of the profession, because the matter of retrieved data being
presented in evidence wiII be of interest to all litigants in the
future, whether they are administrative agencies, public or
private entities, or individuals.

Case Law-Procedure
Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions
Methods of Review. Judicial review of the adjudicatory
decisions of most administrative agencies, state or local, is
provided for in section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
During the year there has been some spotlight on other
methods of judicial review available because of special circumstances. In Eye Dog Foundation v. State Board of Guide Dogs
306
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for the Blind,9 the court was presented with an appeal from
a declaratory relief judgment. Apparently, a party may secure
a declaration as to his right under a particular statute, including a determination of whether the statute is constitutional
where the declaratory action is brought prior to the institution
of any administrative action by the agency. The court held
that the subsequent bringing of disciplinary proceedings
against the plaintiff did not require the plaintiff to exhaust his
administrative remedies before maintaining an action in court.
The sequence of events is important because where the administrative proceeding precedes the filing of the civil action,
the plaintiff will have to exhaust his administrative remedies
before he may petition the courtS.l0
Being somewhat vexed by the time consumed in reviewing
decisions of the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control,
the legislature in 1967 enacted provisions in the Business and
Professions Code to remove the superior court from the
process of reviewing the decisions of that department. Accordingly, the court of appeal and the supreme court now have
jurisdiction over such matters. Samson Market Co. v. Kirby,Il
was one of the first cases to arise under the new legislation. 12
Although the case was not one in which judicial review in the
usual sense was sought from a quasi-judicial determination of
the department, it is instructive in that it shows quite clearly
that whether review is sought from such a decision or relief is
sought in the courts to compel the Department of Alcoholic
Beverage Control to do any particular act with respect to its
operations, the superior courts no longer have control and
that any relief sought, including mandate, must come from
the appellate cour!s.
Scope of Review-Independent Judgment Test v. Substantial Evidence Rule. On the question of scope of review,
the courts have generally continued to observe the existing
9. 67 Cal.2d 536, 63 Cal. Rptr. 21,
432 P.2d 717 (1967).
10. 67 Cal.2d at 543, 544, 63 Cal.
Rptr. at 26, 27, 432 P.2d at 722-723;
Walker v. Munro, 178 Cal. App.2d 67,
2 Cal. Rptr. 737 (1960).

11. 261 Cal. App.2d 577, 68 Cal.
Rptr. 130 (1968), app. dismd. 393 U.S.
II, 21 L.Ed.2d 18, 89 S.Ct. 49.
12. Cal. Business & Professions Code
§ 23090.5.
CAL LAW 1969
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rules and have applied some of those rules to novel situations.
Perhaps one of the best recapitulations of the rules defining
the scope of judicial review is contained in Beverly Hills Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Superior Court. l3 There the
court noted that prior to 1936, the substantial evidence rule
was invoked to review the decisions of any administrative
agency, but since that time and by virtue of Standard Oil Co.
v. Board of Equalization,14 the writ of certiorari was abolished
with respect to state-wide administrative agencies exercising
mere legislatively delegated powers. The court noted that
after the Standard Oil case the courts evolved the limited trial
de novo which was not a complete retrial of the case before the
administrative agency but rather a qualified form of review
with the superior court exercising its independent judgment
on the evidence presented to the agency. The court noted
too that the matter of the limited trial de novo or the independent judgment cases was limited to the situation where
the agency was not exercising constitutionally given powers
and where a vested right was involved. Hence, in a case
where a vested right was not involved, the independent judgment test did not apply, and the scope of review of the evidence was limited to ascertaining whether the action of the
agency was supported by substantial evidence. The court
noted that there had been those kinds of cases over the years
where a state-wide administrative agency's decision would be
reviewed by the substantial evidence rule where a vested
right was not involved. Among the situations involving a
nonvested right would be the denial of a permit, as in M cDonough v. Goodcell/ 5 and the application for old age benefits,
as in Bertch v. Social Welfare Department. l6
In the Beverly Hills Savings case, mandamus action was filed
not by the applicant for a license, but rather by one who was
protesting the issuance of the license. The court held that
such a person had no vested right to prevent the other individual from getting the license and hence the scope of re13. 259 Cal. App.2d 306, 66 Cal.
Rptr. 183 (1968).
14. 6 Cal.2d 557, 59 P.2d 119 (1936).

308
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view was the substantial evidence test. The court, however,
went further and in applying the doctrine to the case, determined that all that the petitioner was entitled to was to have
the court determine whether the commission's action was supported by substantial evidence in light of the whole record,
and this meant that the petitioner was not entitled to various
forms of discovery sought in the trial court. 17 The court noted
further that substantial evidence did not mean that the superior
court had to review the entire record to determine whether
there was substantial evidence, but rather that the substantiality of the evidence is determined by isolating and considering only the evidence supporting the administrative action
in accordance with the usual rule applied in reviewing the
decisions of trial courts by the appellate courts. This being
the rule, the court then held that where the protestant complained that there was evidence dehors the record which was
considered by the commissioner, if the evidence were favorable to the decision, it could not be considered since it was
outside the record, and if the evidence were not favorable to
the decision it could only raise a conflict in the evidence.
The court in County of Madera v. Holcomb,18 determined
that a limited trial de novo was not available to a petitioner
for public assistance who sought review of the Welfare Department's decision denying him aid, there being no vested
right of review which would warrant a trial de novo, as the
court pointed out in the Beverly Hills case.
The matter of the limited trial de novo or independent
judgment test does not apply to agencies exercising powers
granted to them by the State Constitution. Thus when the
court is confronted with a decision involving the Department
of Alcoholic Beverage Control, an agency created by Article
XX, section 22 of the Constitution, the courts are dealing with
an agency that has constitutional power to adjudicate its
17. In light of § 11507.5 added to
the Government Code by Chapter 808
of California Statutes of 1968, it would
appear that discovery would not be
available in the superior court on review
of any agency's decision where the

agency was operating pursuant to the
Administrative Procedure Act (Cal.
Gov. Code §§ 11500-11523).
18. 259 Cal. App.2d 226, 66 Cal.
Rptr. 428 (1968).
CAL LAW 1969
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cases. The court's scope of review then is to determine
whether there is substantial evidence to support the decision
of the agency. Where the Constitution has vested in the
agency discretion to determine whether good cause exists for
the revocation of the license, the agency, not the court, determines whether good cause exists for denying or revoking a
given license on the grounds that its issuance would be contrary to public welfare and morals. The court, however, determines whether the agency acted arbitrarily in making this
decision. Thus, in Kirhy v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board/ 9 the court determined that the department acted
properly in denying a license to a liquor establishment in
proximity to a school.
Even where the scope of review requires use of the substantial evidence test, the supreme court, in Huntley v. Public
Utilities C0n1l11ission,20 determined that the findings of the
administrative agency may not be final on constitutional questions although this does not mean that the court should disregard the weight properly to be attached to findings of an
agency after a hearing and the taking of evidence. Accordingly, where the Public Utilities Commission had modified and
approved schedules requiring record-method subscribers to include in the recording the names of the individuals responsible
for the message, the court held this ruling violative of First
Amendment freedoms.
As the court in the Beverly Hills Savings case indicated, the
interest of the petitioner will determine essentially the type of
review obtainable. Likewise, in Artigues v. California Department of El11ploYl11ent/ the court of appeal had to define the
right to unemployment benefits provided by the Unemployment Insurance Act in order to determine whether these were
property rights within the meaning of the term as used in cases
requiring a limited trial de novo. The court held the petitioner
had such a claim. The case also stands for the proposition

19. 261 Cal. App.2d 119, 67 Cal.
Rptr. 628 (1968).
20. 69 Cal.2d 67. 69 Cal. Rptr. 605,
442 P.2d 685 (1968). For further dis310
CAL LAW 1969
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that although the trial court may engage in a limited trial
de novo and exercise its independent judgment as to what
facts are based on the evidence in the record, the court cannot ignore the undisputed facts in the record. A judgment
rendered contrary to the undisputed facts in the record will
bring about a reversal in such a case.
Again, following along the lines of Beverly Hills Federal
Savings & Loan Assn. v. Superior Court, the court in Western
Airlines Inc. v. Schutzbank,2 indicated that where there was no
vested right involved, the scope of review required the court
to look for substantial evidence. This meant only that the
trial court could not exercise its independent judgment as to
the evidence and that the findings of the agency must be upheld if supported by credible and competent evidence. For
reasons not clearly defined in the opinion, the petitioner
was able to convince the trial court that out of the single issue
of whether there was substantial evidence to support the
findings of the commissioner, two issues could be developed.
One of these was whether there was substantial evidence to
support the findings; the other was whether the order was
supported by the entire record. Because of the so-called
"twin issue" and in spite of the language in Western Air Lines
lJ. Sobieski,3 to which petitioner was also a party, telling the
trial court that it could only look for substantial evidence,
the petitioner argued to the court of appeal that the trial court
was not bound by the findings and could make its own findings contrary to the commissioner's. Support was sought in
such cases as Yakov v. Board of Medical Examiners, 4 and
Moran v. Board of Medical Examiners. s For these cases to
apply, however, the law would have to be changed so as to
give the trial court power to redetermine the weight of the
evidence in a case where no vested rights are involved. The
point having been so clearly spelled out in Sobieski, it seems
2. 258 Cal. App.2d 218, 66 Cal. Rptr.
293 (1968). For further discussion of
this case, see Bader, BUSINESS ASSOCIATlONS, in this volume.

3. 191 Cal. App.2d 399, 12 Cal.
Rptr. 719 (1961).
4. 68 Cal.2d 67, 64 Cal. Rptr. 785,
435 P.2d 553 (1968).
5. 32 Cal.2d 301, 196 P.2d 20 (1948).
CAL LAW 1969
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incredible that it would be the subject of extensive litigation
in Western Airlines Inc. v. Schutzbank.
The rule was stated in Thompson v. City of Long Beach,s
that a trial court, in a case where it is reviewing according to
the substantial evidence test, is bound to disregard the evidence contrary to that received in support of the findings of
the agency. The court in Ferguson v. Kern County Water
Agency,7 relied on such a rule when dealing with a local administrative agency to which the scope of review was the substantial evidence test. This rule was also involved in DeLucia
v. County of Merced,s where the petitioner attempted to get
a trial de novo to settle questions of fact before the superior
court where the appellate court indicated that the taxpayer
had no such right. The only issue properly before the trial
court was whether there was evidence of sufficient substantiality before the local agency to justify its findings.
The term "limited trial de novo" should not conjure up in
the mind of the practitioner visions of introducing new evidence at the mandamus level. Traditionally, the courts have
treated the matter of the limited trial de novo as being akin
to a qualified review, as commented upon in the Beverly Hills
Savings case.
A concrete application of this doctrine is found in Shakin
v. Board of Medical Examiners,9 where the Board of Medical
Examiners, a non-constitutional agency, sought to revoke a
doctor's license to practice medicine and surgery in the State
of California, a vested right. The court pointed out that in
order for the petitioner to be entitled to introduce additional
evidence for the trial court's consideration in a mandamus
proceeding, it must appear that he could not, in the exercise
of diligence, have obtained and introduced such evidence to
the board, or that such evidence was improperly excluded at
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8. 257 Cal. App.2d 620, 65 Cal.
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the hearing. In this connection, the announcement of the
court was certainly in accord with Code of Civil Procedure
section 1094.5, subdivision (d). This provision of the code
was intended, and was traditionally so recognized by the courts
even before the adoption of section 1094.5, to make sure that
the licensee did not simply make a perfunctory or skeletal
showing before the administrative agency with the expectation
of making a fuller showing before the court on review. The
rule is part of the concept of exhausting administrative
remedies-to be discussed later-which also implies that
a party present all legitimate issues before the administrative
In order to preserve the integrity of the
tribunal, ".
proceeding before that body and to endow it with the dignity
beyond that of mere shadow play."lo
Of course, in those situations where the limited trial de
novo rule applies and the trial court can exercise its independent judgment, the rule since Moran v. Board of Medical
Examiners, requires the appellate court to sustain the trial
court if the trial court's findings are supported by credible and
competent evidence. ll
While there have been many cases throughout the year
dealing with the scope of review of adjudicatory decisions
of administrative agencies, perhaps cases decided during the
year that are most helpful are those dealing with review of the
rule-making powers of administrative agencies because these
decisions have tended to sharpen and focus the scope of review
and to delineate the power and responsibility of the courts
in these matters.
At the outset it should be noted that adjudicatory or quasijudicial functions of administrative bodies can be likened to
courtlike activities while rule-making or quasi-judicial functions are analogous to the dealings of a legislative body. This
is an important distinction because the reviewing court's treatment of the two is quite different.
10. Harris v. Alcoholic Beverage
Control Appeals Board, 197 Cal. App.
2d 182, 187, 17 Cal. Rptr. 167, 170
(1961).

11. See Yakov v. Board of Medical
Examiners 68 Cal.2d 67, 64 Cal. Rptr.
785, 435 P.2d 553 (1968). (Decision of
supreme court upholding judgment of
trial court reversing agency.)
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In Ralph's Grocery v. Reimel,12 the court had before it a
rule of the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control which
sought to prohibit manufacturers, importers, and wholesalers
of beer from getting discounts for quantity purchases. The
question was whether this rule was within the authority delegated to the department to promulgate rules that foster and
encourage the orderly wholesale marketing and wholesale distribution of beer. The court held that in determining whether a
specific rule falls within the coverage of the delegated power,
the sole function of the court was to decide whether the department reasonably interpreted the legislative mandate. The
court recognized that while final responsibility for the interpretation of the law rested with the courts, the courts could not
exercise an independent judgment on what constituted promotion of orderly wholesale marketing and distribution. Hence,
there is an area of discretion carved out which restricts the
courts to the question of whether the action of the agency
was consistent with the statutory purpose. The court noted
too, that in reaching the conclusion that the rule was not
arbitrary or capricious, it was not obliged to concern itself
with alternative methods of regulation available to the department. The court noted that only in the field of restriction
of fundamental constitutional rights would the court be concerned with the existence of such alternative methods, citing
Bagley v. Washington Township Hospital D istrict. 13 The
plaintiff in Ralph's Grocery also urged that only by an explicit
expression by the legislature can the agency be delegated
the power to engage in price fixing. The court noted, however, that on the authority of Wilke & Holzheiser Inc. v.
Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control,14 the prohibition
of discounts was not price fixing. This view seems clearly to
undermine Schenley Industries Inc. v. Munro/ 5 where the
court struck down a similar rule relating to distilled spirits,
the rule being mentioned somewhat disapprovingly by the
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supreme court. Administrative regulations cannot amend or
alter a statute or enlarge its scope. 16
The question is often asked: what is the proper scope of
review, i.e., need rules and regulations be supported by any
factual material presented to the agency? With this question
come the other questions relating to what kind of hearing
the administrative agency must hold before it can adopt a
rule or regulation. It has often been stated that there is no
constitutional right to a hearing where an agency exercises
its quasi-legislative function. Whatever procedural requirements there are for a hearing stem from the particular statute
dealing with the agency rather than from any constitutional
demands of due process. The case of Rivera v. Division of
Industrial Welfare/ 7 set out the rules quite well. It indicated
that where the procedural requirements governing the agency's
quasi-legislative hearing fall somewhere between the extremes
of purely argument type hearings, which do not provide opportunity for cross-examination and do allow independent investigations outside the hearing process, and the strictly trial type
of hearings, which require opportunity for cross-examination
and rebuttal as well as confinement to the hearing records, such
proceedings may exclude cross-examinations, need not provide
access to the body of information from which the statistical
compilations and summaries are drawn by the agency's staff,
and may dispense with specific and detailed findings. If,
however, the agency's staff brings in factual material not
available to the public, the parties must be apprised of it
during the hearing process, and cross-examination and rebuttal
must be permitted. Thus, the statute dealing with the procedure must be analyzed to determine its nature; and by the
same token, court decisions, which seem to speak in terms of
rights to cross-examine and the right to see certain evidence,
should not be applied across the board to every type of quasilegislative hearing. The plaintiff should not attempt to have
the reviewing court superimpose its own policy judgment but
16. Morris v. Williams, 67 Cal.2d
733, 63 Cal. Rptr. 689, 433 P.2d 697
(1967).
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should try to establish that the action of the agency has been
arbitrary. And with respect to a quasi-legislative decision
like 'that of the Industrial Welfare Commission, the assailant
has the burden of establishing that the commission's action
had no evidentiary support.
Because of the difference between the quasi-judicial process
and the quasi-legislative process, it has been held that administrative mandamus, provided for in Code of Civil Procedure
section 1094.5, is not available to review the decisions of
agency-adopted rules and regulations. It will be noted in
passing that Government Code section 11440 has specifically
provided the mechanism for review of the quasi-legislative
acts of administrative agencies on the state level to the extent
that they are governed by the quasi-legislative portions of the
Administrative Procedure Act. 18
The question of the time to seek judicial review pursuant
to Government Code section 11523 and Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 now seems to be settled. Although
dealing with a specific section of the Business and Professions Code, the court in Reimal v. House/ 9 indicated that
the 30 days to seek review starts from the actual effective
date of the decision of the agency and not from some mythical
date earlier conjured as in the decision of Walters v. Contractors' License Board. 20
Procedure at Administrative Hearings
During the year, perhaps the most interesting case in the
field of administrative hearing procedures was the case that
extended the right to hearing to a person not normally thought
of as being in a class of people entitled to a hearing or even
over whom the agency had jurisdiction. In Endler v. Schutzbank,l the plaintiff, after a number of years in the finance
18. Wilson v. Hidden Valley Municipal Water Dis!., 256 Cal. App.2d 271,
63 Cal. Rptr. 889 (1967).
19. 264 Cal. App.2d - , 70 Cal.
Rptr. 224 (1968).
20. 229 Cal. App.2d 449, 40 Cal.
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business, found himself unable to obtain employment because
the Commissioner of Corporations had allegedly labeled him
persona non grata, and threatened to bring disciplinary proceedings against any financial associations hiring him. Plaintiff had worked for a financial institution, and according to the
description presented in the opinion of the supreme court,
the institution had been advised to let plaintiff go. The
institution was loath to do so. Later, disciplinary proceedings were begun against the financial house and, finally, the
plaintiff was dismissed. Two weeks later the proceedings
against the financial institution were also dismissed. The
commissioner had offered to conduct an informal hearing
on the charges against the plaintiff with the understanding
that any such informal hearing was not taken pursuant to
any specified statute or statutory authority. The quest of the
plaintiff was to find a way to protect his name and be able
to meet the charges which the commissioner supposedly had
against him. The court recognized that the right to employment was very valuable and suggested that although there
was no precise administrative remedy provided, one could be
improvised. The action of the court was based on the Fourteenth Amendment insofar as it protects the pursuit of one's
profession from abridgement by arbitrary state action. The
case also recognized that the state had some right to regulate
various people in the exercise of professions and callings and
that the contours of due process in this connection would not
necessarily always be the same. The court had cited a number of cases where persons' employment rights were terminated without a hearing and then summed up the situation
as follows:
We thus reaffirm an elementary requirement of justice
where we hold, as we do here, that the state may not
make a man an outcast in his own profession without
affording him a full opportunity to present his defense. 2
There may be other agencies which are faced with this
problem; for example, the Department of Alcoholic Beverage
2. 68 Cal.2d at 173, 65 Cal. Rptr. at
304, 436 P.2d at 304.
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Control may revoke a license or discipline a licensee for
employing a manager who does not have the same qualifications as the licensee. 3 Perhaps the department in a situation
like this may proceed in either of two fashions. In any action
brought against a licensee for hiring an unqualified manager,
the department could name the manager as a party respondent and serve on him the necessary papers; he could participate
or not participate in the hearing, as he wished, but at least
he would have been afforded a hearing. On the other hand,
when the question first arises whether a given person should
be hired as a manager, the department could set up a hearing
on a statement of issues 4 and if any question is raised as to
the jurisdiction of the department to proceed to hear the
case, it might assert that while there is no statutory jurisdiction
to hear the case, there might be a constitutional mandate,
citing Endler v. Schutzbank. Other agencies may be faced
with the same problem in the process of experimentation.
Perhaps the answer to the problem posed by lack of legislative
jurisdiction over the particular individual may be solved pragmatically until such time as the legislature provides a hearing
procedure or makes for inclusion into existing hearing procedures.
Throughout the year questions relating to the kind of evidence admissible and to its effect once admitted were the
subject of judicial discussion. Specifically, the issue of collateral estoppel, which was raised by the decision of the
supreme court in Teitelbaum Furs Inc. v. Dominion Insurance
Co., Ltd.,s received much attention.
Prior to Teitelbaum it had been held in Manning v. Watson,6
that proof of a specific act SUbjecting a licensee to disciplinary
action could not be proved simply by showing conviction for
such act. The court held that such acts were hearsay. It
would appear that on the basis of Teitelbaum the hearsay
question would be removed and indeed, the conclusion that
§

3. Cal. Business & Professions Code
23788.5.
4. Cal. Government Code § 11504.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1969/iss1/13 318

CAL LAW 1969

5. 58 Cal.2d 601, 25 Cal. Rptr. 559,
375 P.2d 439 (1962).
6. 108 Cal. App.2d 705, 711, 239
P.2d 688, 692 (1952).

22

Manuel: Administrative Law

Administrative Law

the acts took place should be compelled. The courts, however, have not agreed upon that proposition. In the case of
Richards v. Gordon,7 the court was dealing with a statute
which provided that a final judgment in a civil action against
a real estate licensee upon grounds of fraud, misrepresentation
or deceit with respect to transactions for which he is licensed
gave the Real Estate Commissioner grounds for disciplining
the licensee. In Richards, such a judgment was shown, yet
the trial court attempted to annul the action of the Real Estate
Commissioner. Apparently, at the administrative hearing
there was an attempt to introduce evidence of an impeaching
nature concerning the civil judgment, but the evidence was
excluded. The court of appeal held that the document res
judicata collaterally estopped the impeachment of the prior
judgment, and citing such cases as Contractors' State License
Board v. Superior Court,S and Bernhard v. Bank of America,9
the court concluded:
[T]he trial court erred in finding that respondent was
not collaterally estopped from impeaching the prior findings and judgment that fraud and deceit had been perpetrated by him in the [last] transaction. Io
In Lundborg v. Director of the Department of Professional
and Vocational Standards/ 1 the court was faced with a private
investigator who had suffered a civil judgment against him,
which essentially involved dishonesty or fraud. The judgment, properly certified, was introduced into evidence along
with the findings. There was no objection to the admission
of these documents at the administrative hearing and, in fact,
the parties had a discussion with regard to the matter at the
hearing. The hearing officer indicated that he felt that the
doctrine of res judicata barred the licensee from contesting
the allegations that he had committed an act of dishonesty
7. 254 Cal. App.2d 735, 62 Cal.
Rptr. 466 (1967).
8. 187 Cal. App.2d 557, 10 Cal. Rptr.
95 (1960).
9. 19 Cal.2d 807, 122 P.2d 892
(1942).

10. 254 Cal. App.2d at 742, 62 Cal.
Rptr. at 471.
11. 257 Cal. App.2d 141, 64 Cal.
Rptr 650 (1967).
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or fraud, and the licensee's attorney agreed that the hearing
officer was bound by the judgment and announced his intention to limit his case to the facts in mitigation. As a result,
the matter was tried and a decision of revocation was rendered by the agency. Represented later by another attorney,
the licensee went to court and secured from the superior court
a judgment ordering the issuance of a peremptory writ of
mandate against the director of the department commanding
him to annul the revocation order. The trial court held
specifically that Lundborg had not committed any act of dishonesty or fraud in his relationship with the person involved
in the civil judgment. The court of appeal, division two
of the first district, held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel
enunciated in Bernhard v. Bank of America, and Teitelbaum
Furs Inc. v. Dominion Insurance Co., Ltd., had no place
in the case and could not be invoked in the determination of
the efficacy of the charge at the hearing. The court also
relied in part on the case of Title v. Immigration & Naturalization Service/ 2 where the court indicated that a prior denaturalization proceeding was not res judicata on the fact of the
person's Communist affiliations in a subsequent deportation
proceeding, the court noting some congressional intention that
an alien would have a right to present evidence at each hearing
to stave off the charges against him.
The court, in Lundborg, merely bridged the gap between the
federal case and the case at bar by stating that the hearing
officer's application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel limited his consideration of the evidence to deprive the licensee
of a full and complete hearing required by the statute. The
court did note, however, cases in the real estate field dealing
with the statute there involved and noted that there was no
similar statute here making a prior civil judgment grounds
for disciplinary proceedings. The court reasoned that if the
prior judgment were to have this effect in the case before it,
the legislature would have so indicated as it had done in the
real estate field.
Of interest to the practitioner beyond the point of collateral
12. 322 F.2d 21 (9th Cir. [1963]).
320
CAL LAW 1969

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1969/iss1/13

24

Manuel: Administrative Law

Administrative Law

estoppel is the court's reasoning that since the judge had erroneously exercised his discretion on the erroneous theory of
collateral estoppel, he had not fully exhausted the use of his
discretion and hence, the matter should be remanded to him
for a proper hearing.
The decision of the court in Lundborg received mild criticism in McNeil's Inc. v. Contractors State License Board. 13
The court pointed out in a footnote:
The opinion in Lundborg v. Director of the Department
of Professional etc. Standards, supra, 257 Cal. App. 2d
620, did not consider the decision in Contractors' State
License Board v. Superior Court, 187 Cal. App. 2d 557,
562 [10 Cal. Rptr. 95], approving the application of the
doctrine of collateral estoppel by judgment in a contractor's license revocation proceeding.14
Nevertheless, the court in McNeil's Inc., noted that the
judgment introduced in evidence came in along with other
evidence supporting the charges; the judgment did not stand
alone as a basis for collateral estoppel. The decision in
Lundborg, however, becomes a little bit more difficult to
understand when one considers the case of Pathe v. City of
Bakersfield/ 5 which recognized that a decision of the Industrial Accident Commission may be binding on a pension board
under the guise of res judicata. The court relied somewhat
on the earlier case of French v. Rishell/ 6 which held that
the doctrine of res judicata is applicable where the identical
issue was decided in the prior case by a final judgment on the
merits and the party against whom the plea is asserted is a
party or privy to the party to a prior adjudication. It might
be noted that in Gale v. State Board of Equalization,17 a determination of the Public Utilities Commission was held to col13.
Rptr.
14.
Rptr.

262 Cal. App.2d 322, 68 Cal.
640 (1968).
262 Cal. App.2d at 328, 68 Cal.
at 644.
15. 255 Cal. App.2d 409, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 220 (1967).
21
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laterally estop a taxpayer in his suit for refund of taxes filed
against the Board of Equalization.
Criminal Law and Related Problems and Their Effect on
Administrative Procedure

The courts of this state had occasion to consider Miranda
v. Arizona/ 8 in an administrative law setting. No special
effort is made here to explain the so-called Miranda decision
other than to point out that in a criminal proceeding a person
who has the focus of suspicion placed on him while in custody
of a peace officer has the right to be told before being interrogated and before answering questions that he has the right
to remain silent; that he has the right to counsel; and that
if he cannot afford counsel, one will be provided for him.
The question has raged a bit over the application of these
rights to a person who is being charged administratively. In
the case of Mumford v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage
Control,19 the licensee, relying on People v. Dorad0 20 (California's anticipation of the Miranda case) contended that his
admission was inadmissible because the record did not show
that he was warned of his constitutional rights to silence and
counsel as required by the First, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. The court held
that the introduction into evidence of Mumford's admission
did not deprive him of property without due process of law
because his license to sell intoxicating liquors was not a proprietary right within the meaning of due process. It will
be noted that the court also disposed of his contention that
the admission was inadmissible hearsay, the court reasoning
that it was admissible as an admission by a party, an exception
to the hearsay rule. Thus, the admission came in as direct
evidence under Government Code section 11513, subdivision
(c). It should be noted that the Miranda rule in the administrative law setting will be discussed later in the material
relating to the subject of drivers' licenses and implied consent. 1
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Although it should come as no surprise, in Arenstein v.
California State Board of Pharmacy,2 the court held that a
plea of guilty in a criminal prosecution was admissible in the
administrative proceeding to prove charges contained in the
accusation. The court noted that although one may contest
the truth of the matters admitted in his plea of guilty and
may present all the facts surrounding the same including the
nature of the charges, the plea, and the reason for entering
such plea, it is probable that all adjudicatory proceedings
are viewed at sometime by the judge or trier of fact in light
of matters outside the record. As pointed out earlier in the
case of Beverly Hills Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Superior
Court, the superior court dismissed the contention that the
Savings & Loan Commissioner considered evidence outside
the record. Based upon the court's consideration of what
type of hearing the petitioner was entitled to the court determined that the petitioner was entitled to a hearing only to
determine if there was substantial evidence in the record to
support the decision of the agency. The court was not, however, inclined to concern itself with the contention that evidence outside the record had been considered.
In Shakin v. Board of Medical Examiners, the matter had
been heard by the Board of Medical Examiners at a hearing.
Evidence was taken, but subsequently a new hearing was held
before a different hearing officer and at the second hearing
the doctor appeared before the Medical Board with an attorney for the first time. As a result of this hearing the doctor's
license was revoked. It was his contention that his license
had been revoked because of evidence that was introduced
at the first hearing where he was not represented by counsel
and that this evidence had had an adverse effect on the board
at the second hearing. Among other things the court pointed
out:
Appellant contends that the Board rendered its decision
on ex parte evidence since it retained the memory of the
officer's testimony introduced at the earlier hearing. The
2. 265 Cal. App.2d - , 71 Cal. Rptr.
357 (\968).
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Board, however, adopted the hearing officer's proposed
decision in its entirety; that decision rested completely
upon the evidence adduced at the June 28 de novo
hearing [the second hearing]. The hearing officer was
not present at the earlier hearing and no resort to ex parte
evidence of any sort occurred, as the trial court properly
found. 3
Administrative heads, as well as judges, are sometimes subjected to the charge that they lean in a certain direction as
far as law or the policy of the law is concerned. In Western
Airlines v. Schutzbank, the contention was made that the
commissioner was biased and prejudiced because he had a
policy in favor of cumulative voting with respect to the election
of voter-directors of corporations. The court pointed out that
the fact that a hearing officer or judge believes or does not
believe in the law which must be applied to evidence before
him does not disqualify him or make him biased or prejudiced.
The courts over the past year have also given some thought
to the matter of evidence and, again, in Shakin, the court held
that since this was not a criminal proceeding, the corpus
delicti did not have to be established and that the admissions
of any party could be relied upon in the absence of independent evidence to support the agency's findings and decisions with
respect to the charges of unprofessional conduct. In Goss v.
Department of Motor Vehicles,4 the court held that the charges
of the agency might be proved simply by the licensee's testimony.
In Arenstein the court held that the agency might take official notice that drugs referred to by their brand names were
dangerous drugs within the meaning of Business and Professions Code section 4211. 5 Usually the agency has the burden
of making sure that an intelligible record of formal proceedings
at an adjudicatory hearing has been prepared. In the case
of County of Madera v. Holcomb, supra, this same question
3. 254 Cal. App.2d at 110, 62 Cal.
Rptr. at 281, app. dismd. 390 U.S . .110,
19 L.Ed.2d 1272,88 S.C!. 1112.
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was raised with regard to the sufficiency of the administrative
record which had been prepared from a phonographic taping
rather than by stenographic reporter. The court, however,
while noting that portions of the record were labeled "inaudible", noted that the balance of the record, in accordance
with the statute, was sufficient for the purpose of the trial
court and was not so unintelligible as to require reversal.
The Decision-making Process
There have been a few cases dealing with the process by
which decisions are reached. The court in Wilhelm v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board,6 emphasized that while
an agency may not believe all the evidence presented, it still
has the duty to reach substantial understanding of the record;
accordingly, it cannot disregard testimony and hold in effect
that there is no such evidence. This is a problem encountered
by an agency deciding a case on reconsideration or, acting
under Government Code section 11517, subdivision (c), deciding the case itself after rejecting the hearing officer's proposed decision. The problem in Wilhelm stems from the
semantic trap of saying "there is no evidence" when one really
means "the evidence lacks sufficient convincing power". W ilhelm, however, has one additional point not often raised.
Due process does not require the agency to hear a petition
for reconsideration in the presence of counsel.
In Cooper v. State Board oj Medical Examiners/ the
supreme court held that where the members of the Board
of Medical Examiners sat and heard a case and some of
the members' terms expired and they were replaced by new
members, the latter, after reading the administrative record,
could, with the remaining members who heard the case, decide
it. A local body, however, may find itself unable to operate
in this manner if local law specifically provides that only
those present at the hearing may vote. 8
6. 255 Cal. App.2d 30, 62 Cal. Rptr.
829 (1967).
7. 35 Cal.2d 242, 217 P.2d 630, 18
A.L.R.2d 593 (1950).

8. Rigley v. Board of Retirement,
260 Cal. App.2d 445,67 Cal. Rptr. 185
(1968).
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Questions have often been raised as to the propriety of
making changes in administrative decisions. A real estate
broker had a license allowing him to operate under two business names at two locations. By mistake the order of revocation specified only one of the business names. In Russ v.
Smith,9 the court approved of the commissioner's entering a
nunc pro tunc order a month later making the decision applicable to both names. A revocation affecting only one location or name was no revocation at all, reasoned the court.
The court noted that the disciplinary proceeding was in personam against the licensee, not in rem against the license.
Where on one set of facts pleaded, proven and found, the
Registrar of Contractors asserted grounds for disciplinary action under three code sections, the court in McNeil's Inc. v.
Contractors State License Board, supra, held that if the findings supported a charge of misconduct under anyone of the
code sections, the fact that the other two sections were included was of no consequence. Although Government Code
section 11518 separates an administrative decision into three
parts-findings of fact, determination of issues, and recommendations-the court in McNeil's Inc., held that the segregation was of no moment in determining what facts were
actually found. The court reaffirmed the traditional view
that findings are to be liberally construed; administrative findings need not be stated with the formality required of judicial
findings; the doctrine of implied findings is applicable to administrative agencies; and findings need not include every
evidentiary fact in dispute.
Although agencies created by the constitution may issue
decisions to which the doctrine of res judicata may apply,lO
decisions of non-constitutional state-wide administrative agencies do not have this effect. l l
9. 264 Cal. App.2d -,70 Cal. Rptr.
813 (1968).
10. Hollywood Circle, Inc. v. Department of ABC, 55 Cal.2d 728, 732, 13
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Driver's License-Implied Consent Law

The period under review saw the settling of some basic
issues relating to the implied consent law, the popular name
given to California Vehicle Code section 13353.
By way of background to a discussion of the California
implied consent law, it should be noted that yearly some
53,000 people die on the nation's highways and that approximately one-half of all auto fatalities involve the drunken
driver. 12 The California Highway Patrol reports that the
drinking driver was observed in one-third of all fatal traffic
accidents in 1966, which involved some 1,534 victims in
1,311 accidents. 13 In People v. Sudduth,14 the Supreme Court
of this state seemed to encourage the use of scientific aids
such as breathalyzers to determine the question of intoxication, a question otherwise dependent upon fallible human
observation. Perhaps the purpose of the implied consent
law is to create a system by which one either takes the test
or faces the consequences of suspension of this driving license.
This system, of course, removes any necessity to use physical
force on the suspect and prevents the struggle likely to arise
when an intoxicated driver refuses to do what the peace officer
effecting the arrest insists he is bound to do. 15 Cases such
as Sudduth also recognize that there is a certain fairness
about employing scientific aids to intoxication detection because these aids not only have the ability to prove guilt but
also innocence. California has recognized the taking of blood
samples even though the person has not consented as far
back as People v. Duroncelay;16 and Schmerber v. California,
advanced that recognition even more. 17 On the other hand,
there were theoretkal limits beyond which the peace officers
12. Kelner, Highway Murder, New
Republic, p. 13, Sept. 2, 1967.
13. Report of California Highway
Patrol Department on Fatal and Injury
Motor Vehicle Traffic Accidents, 1966,
pp. 6, 10-11 (1967).
14. 65 Cal.2d 543, 55 Cal. Rptr. 393,
421 P.2d 401 (1966), cert. den. 389 U.S.
850, 19 L.Ed.2d 119, 88 S.Ct. 43.

15. Weinstein, Chemical Tests for 111toxicatioll, 45 Journal Criminal Law &
Criminology, 541, 543 (1954-55).
16. 48 Cal.2d 766, 312 P.2d 690
( 1957).
17. 384 U.S. 757, 16 L.Ed.2d 908,
86 S.Ct. 1826 (1966).
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could not use the offer of force to extract blood samples. ls
Accordingly, a statute was needed to provide a systematic
and orderly method for approaching the subject in an attempt
to arrive at a method of getting a blood sample without trial
by battle. 19
Thus the implied consent law took effect in 1966. By 1967
a multitude of cases were filed in the superior courts under
section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure to review the
action of the Department of Motor Vehicles suspending drivers' licenses for six months, pursuant to provisions of the new
law. Superior court rulings with respect to the law varied
not only from superior court to superior court, but the clash
in ideas among the judges within a given superior court was
notable. Hence, the decisions which were handed down by
the appellate courts, particularly in the summer of 1968, have
proved quite helpful in resolving the issues involved.
What the New Law Entails. Pursuant to Vehicle Code
Section 13353, the Department of Motor Vehicles may suspend the driving privileges of a person if (1) the person
was arrested for any offense committed while driving on a
public highway under the influence of intoxicating liquors;
(2) a peace officer had reasonable cause to believe the person
had been driving on a public highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor; and (3) the person has been
advised that the failure to submit to a chemical test to determine the alcoholic content of his blood would result in the
suspension of his driving privileges for a period of six months.
Under the statute the person who has been arrested and requested to submit to the chemical test has a choice of testsblood, breath or urine. If the person refuses to submit to
the test, the peace officer, having reasonable cause to believe
that the person was driving a motor vehicle on the highway
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, submits a
sworn statement to the Department of Motor Vehicles show-

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1969/iss1/13

18. People v. Barton, 261 Cal. App.
2d 561, 564, 68 Cal. Rptr. 157, 159-160
(1968).
19. Rausenbush, Constitutionality ill
Wisconsill of Compulsory Scientific
328
CAL LAW 1969

Tests for Intoxication, Wisconsin
Review, pp. 251,259 (1953). See
ginia's Implied Consent Statute, a
rey and Appraisal, Virginia Law
view, pp. 386, 397 (1963).

Law
VirSurRe-

32

Manuel: Administrative Law

Administrative Law

ing his reasonable cause and the refusal of the person to
submit to the test. The department thereupon issues its
order suspending the driving privileges of the individual for
six months. The statute affords the driver an opportunity
for a hearing upon a timely request. A timely request for
a hearing stays the order of suspension and the matter is set
for hearing on four issues: (1) whether there was an arrest;
(2) whether there was reasonable cause to believe the person
was driving on a highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor; (3) whether there was a refusal to submit
to the test; and (4) whether the driver was told that his
driving privileges would be suspended if he refused to take
the test. The Department of Motor Vehicles, at the conclusion of the hearing, makes its order and findings and either
revokes or affirms the action to suspend.
Implied Consent v. Constitutional Protections. Although
the constitutional question with regard to the right to counsel
with respect to the taking of these tests would appear to
have been answered clearly in cases such as United States v.
Billy Joe Wade,20 Schmerber, and People v. Sudduth, supra,
attorneys continued to press the issue sometimes gaining surprising success in the superior courts. Accordingly, the cases
involving the implied consent law were also cases that had
more definitive statements to make with regard to the right
to counsel as well as with regard to the allied right against
self-incrimination when one was confronted with the request
to submit to a chemical test. In Finley v. Orr/ the court
took up the questions of the right to counsel and the right
against self-incrimination. Principally on the authority of
Schmerber, the court held that there was no infringement of
the right against self-incrimination in requiring submission to
a chemical test under the implied consent law, there being
no testimonial compulsion. Likewise in Fallis v. Department
of Motor Vehicles,2 the court held that there was no right
either under the First or Fifth Amendments of the United
20. 388 U.S. 218, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149,
87 S.O. 1926 (1967).
1. 262 Cal. App.2d 656, 69 Cal. Rptr.
137 (19681.
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LAW, in this volume.
CAL LAW 1969
329

33

Administrative Law

Cal Law Trends and Developments, Vol. 1969, Iss. 1 [1969], Art. 13

States Constitution to remain silent in the face of a request
to submit to a chemical test. Finley also held that there was
no right to counsel at the time the police demanded that the
driver submit to a chemical test. Although the court in
Finley did not rely on the decision in United States v. Billy
Joe Wade, the court might have referred to that authority
for the proposition that at the stage that a chemical test is
requested a critical stage in the criminal proceeding has not
been reached so as to require the protection of the rights
secured by the Miranda case. The court also took pains
to mention the case of People v. Ellis,s wherein the defendant
claimed that he was confused by the giving of the Miranda
warning, which in effect told him that he could be quiet, and
the request by the police officer that he speak. In that case
his speech was required for voice identification. In Finley,
the court noted that in Ellis there may have been a certain
similarity between speech in terms of speech for conversation
and speech for voice identification, but in the case where the
fellow is asked to take the test, as in Finley, and the man
refuses, his refusal is not really remaining silent and hence,
the strong indication is that there is no confusion between the
Miranda warnings and his duties under the implied consent
law. Finley also stands for the proposition that since the
proceedings concerning driver's license suspensions are civil
in nature, no person then has the right to counsel upon request
to submit to the test.
In the case of Ent v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 4 the
court noted that there was no right to counsel and, relying
on Fallis, held that one was not entitled to counsel before
deciding which test to take. The court made it clear that it
was rejecting the licensee's contention that she needed and
was entitled to the advice of counsel in choosing which of
the three tests to take. The court also decided in Ent that
the police had no duty to warn the driver that she had no
right to counsel at such time. The driver in Ent relied almost
entirely on People v. Ellis in making this contention. The
3. 65 Cal.2d 529, 55 Cal. Rptr. 385,
421 P.2d 393 (1966).
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court rejected the contention on two grounds: (1) there was
nothing in the record to indicate that the police ever attempted
to carry out a process of interrogation lending itself to eliciting incriminating statements or that the Miranda or any similar
warning was ever given or required; and (2) that on the
basis of footnote 14 in People v. Ellis 5 even if the warning
were given it could not mislead the driver into believing
she had the right to counsel because what was sought was
evidence of other physical characteristics, not voice or voice
characteristics or voice identification.
Thus, the courts have spoken rather clearly and forcefully
on the issue of the right to counsel. So definite have the courts
been that in Fallis the court held that where the individual
said that he would not take the test without his attorney or
doctor being present, there was a refusal. The statement was
made that any equivocal refusal may be interpreted as a refusal. The court in Finley took up the question of conditional consent, i.e., consent to take the test if an attorney
or doctor is present; the court concluded that a driver, when
requested to take the required test, cannot impose a condition
that a doctor of his own choice be present during the taking
of the test and, impliedly, no condition as to the presence
of his attorney can be imposed either.
What Constitutes "Refusal". In Ent v. Department of Motor
Vehicles, the trial court had indicated that the petitioner had
not refused to take the test but in essence only asked that
the taking of the test be delayed until her attorney could be
present. In its conclusion of law the trial court stated that
the reply to the officer's request only amounted to delay and
did not amount to a refusal under California law. The appellate court, however, found that a refusal had taken place.
One of the considerations which is present throughout all
of these cases, including People v. Sudduth, is the idea that
the law should not encourage any refusal that might operate
to suppress evidence of intoxication which disappears rapidly
with the passage of time.
5. 65 Cal.2d at 539, 55 Cal. Rptr. at
390, 421 P.2d at 398.
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In considering the question of a consent conditioned upon
the test being administered by the licensee's physician, the
courts, as we have noted, have treated this as a refusal. The
statutory scheme provides for what might be referred to as
the "police test" under section 13353 of the California Vehicle
Code. 6 However, the law also provides for what may be referred to as the "additional test" under Vehicle Code section
13354, which recognizes the right of a driver to procure his
own, and additional, test. Thus, the court in Fallis was able
to perceive that the test administered by the driver's own physician was the additional test guaranteed by section 13354 and
that this was not the test which the police were entitled to under
section 13353. In so recognizing, the court had before it good
authority from both New York and South Dakota. 7 It will
be noted also that the court in Fallis struck down the assertion
by the licensee that he was suffering from some malady which
prevented him from submitting to a chemical test of his
blood. While the court did not explain it further, it appeared
that if the individual were suffering from some malady which
made it impossible for him to submit to a blood test, he stilI had
the choice of the other two tests. While it might be within
the realm of possibility that some condition might prevent him
from submitting to the urine test, it is hard to imagine a
viable driver who could not breathe.
Perhaps, one of the more unique defenses raised was the
defense of being too drunk to refuse. In Bush v. Bright,S the
superior court held the driver in question was so far gone that
he was rendered incapable of refusal. Part of the problem
was raised by that portion of section 13353 which states that:
Any person who is dead, unconscious, or otherwise in
a condition rendering him incapable of refusal shall be
deemed not to have withdrawn his consent.
It might be noted that his consent is the implied consent one
gives to such a test by driving on the highway. It has been
6. People v. Dawson, 184 Cal. App.
2d Supp. 881, 7 Cal. Rptr. 384 (1960).
7. Sowa v. Hults, 22 App. Div. 2d
730,253 N.Y.S.2d 294. 295-296 (1964);
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contended that this provlSlon was intended to provide that
the person arrested would have certain inalienable rights
and that the legislature being aware of these rights wanted
to give the driver an opportunity to make a reasonable choice
or waiver. However, the court indicated that the driver and
the superior court must construe the nature and purpose of
the statute. The court was concerned that one might use
physical force to avoid taking the test, and thus become
dangerous to himself and those charged with administering it.
This being so, he is excused from taking the test from his indication of unwillingness, but once he does that he then suffers
the risk of losing his license. The court held then, that if the
requirements of section 13353 are otherwise met, regardless
of the degree of the voluntary intoxication or lack of understanding resulting therefrom, when the driver of an automobile refuses to submit or otherwise manifests an unwillingness to take the test, he is subject to the license suspension
provisions of the section. As an aside, perhaps in practice,
one who is incapable of refusal will never be involved in any
of these cases because the very condition which makes it impossible for him to refuse will make it impossible for him to
drive the automobile. These are points of intoxication never
quite reached by any of the drivers in these cases.
In the case of August v. Department of Motor Vehicles,9
the court had before it a similar issue. In the various subdivisions of the opinion, the court carried this heading for one
of its discussions: "The claim that intoxication rendered
licensee incapable of intelligently refusing to submit to the
test does not avert the consequences of the refusal."lO The
court under this discussion noted that the lack of recollection
was not inconsistent with the driver's being aware at the
time of what the officer said to him and what he said to the
officer and apparently, this was the bulk of the proof advanced in the case.
In the case of Zidell v. Bright,n the court had before it a
9. 264 Cal. App.2d 52, 70 Cal. Rptr.
172 (1968).

11. 264 Cal. App.2d - , 71 Cal. Rptr.
111 (1968).

10. 264 Cal. App.2d at 67, 70 Cal.
Rptr. at 182.
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case where the driver manifested his refusal and some 30
to 45 minutes later changed his mind. Although the arresting
officer had left in the interim a telephone call was made to
him. The officer refused to return, and no test was ever given.
The court held that there had been a refusal in this situation.
The court relied on the language in the statute12 to this effect:
The test shall be incidental to a lawful arrest and
administered at the direction of a peace officer having
reasonable cause to believe such person was driving
. . . while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. 13
The court said that this language implied that the decision
of the arresting officer whether to request the test and the
subject's response thereto should not be delayed. It was
further contended by the appellant that he had a right to have
the officer give him a chemical test under subdivision (f) of
section 13353. The court held that this contention could not
be sustained. That subdivision was to permit the suspected
drunk driver to obtain a chemical test only if the arresting
officer failed to take the initiative. The court concluded that
the legislature did not add subdivision (f) to give an accused
drunk driver the right to refuse the officer's request to submit
to the test and thereafter the right to demand that the test
be given. The court held further that it would be inconsistent
with the purpose of the statute to hold that the arresting officer
or the officers placed in charge of the driver at the police
station where he was being held, should turn aside from their
other duties and responsibilities and arrange for the administration of the belated test when once there had been a refusal
after fair warning. A similar situation was presented in Ent
where the driver's request that her attorney be present resulted
in a delay of one hour between the time of the request and the
time the attorney arrived. The court noted, however, that even
though the delay caused by the respondent's demand for the
presence of her attorney was a period of only one hour, the
department would still have the right to suspend her license
under section 13353. The court relied on Zidell in great part
12. 264 Cal. App.2d at - , 71 Cal.
Rptr. at 112-113.
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as well as the language appearing in Sudduth that the evidence
of intoxication disappears rapidly with the passage of time and
therefore, a refusal that might operate to suppress such evidence should not be encouraged as a device to escape prosecution.
These implied consent cases also dispose of some other procedural matters which are of interest to the lawyer practicing
in the administrative law field. In Finley, the court once again
sought to inter the perennial contention that a judicial function was delegated to an administrative department, thus depriving the licensee of due process. The licensee was
particularly concerned with the question of determining
whether the peace officer had a reasonable cause. This determination was delegated to the department. Citing the
case of Escobedo v. State oj Calijornia,14 the court held that
this was not an invalid delegation of judicial power to the administrative agency. It was next urged by the licensee in
Finley that he was denied an impartial hearing. He argued
that the department acted as both the accuser and judge.
The court, on the strength of Hohreiter v. Garrison/ 5 held that
the contention was not only improper but that there was
nothing in the record to indicate that the driver was not
afforded a fair hearing.
In Serenko v. Bright/ 6 the driver contended that section
13353 was not applicable to her because she had been issued
her driving license prior to the enactment of the section. She
contended that the application of the section, insofar as it
attempted to proceed on the concept of implied consent, was a
retroactive application which she believed to be unconstitutional. The court pointed out that it was not the act of obtaining the driver's license which brought the statute into
play, but that it was the act of driving from which the
driver's implied consent to the chemical test flowed. The
statute, the court said, was broad enough to encompass all
14. 35 Cal.2d 870, 877,222 P.2d 1, 6
(1950).
15. 81 Cal. App.2d 384, 392-393,
184 P.2d 323, 328-329 (1947).

16. 263 Cal. App.2d 682, 70 Cal.
Rptr. I (1968).
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drivers on California highways whether licensed by California,
other jurisdictions, or even if unlicensed. The licensee noted
that she had pleaded guilty to the criminal charge of violating
Vehicle Code section 23102, subdivision (a) ("drunk driving") and that the traffic court, pursuant to Vehicle Code
section 13352, had recommended that there be no suspension.
Based upon this, the licensee argued that her license should
not be suspended. The court noted that section 13353 was
not a section which was based on section 13352 at all, the
latter section providing for the suspension of the driving
privileges on certain convictions of driving while intoxicated.
Section 13353 is not predicated upon driving while intoxicated or even on conviction therefor, but is predicated on refusal to submit to the chemical test. Moreover, the duty of
the department to suspend the license for six months is clear;
the statute's use of the word "shall" makes it a mandatory
duty rather than a discretionary act on the part of the department. Thus, the fact that the person in Serenko subsequently pleaded guilty or that the court recommended no
suspension had no effect on the proceedings under section
13353. Thus, the court indicated that the arrestee, by subsequent guilty plea, had no power to avoid retroactively the
consequences of his or her earlier refusal to cooperate. It
was also contended that the licensee in Serenko, was prejudiced
because her case did not come up for hearing within the 15
day period provided for in section 13353; but the court noted
that the section also provided that if the case was not heard
within the 15-day period, the suspension should not take
place until the department had ultimately decided the case;
thus, there was no prejudice by delay.
Hearing Procedures Under the New Law. The application
of the implied consent law not only brought about the interesting divergent comments of the superior courts with regard to the substantive problems involved but also brought
into sharp focus for examination the hearing procedures of
the Department of Motor Vehicles. Basically, the hearing
procedures of the department involved either a formal hearing
procedure conducted substantially pursuant to the provisions
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1969/iss1/13
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of the Administrative Procedure Act,17 or an informal hearing
procedure conducted pursuant to the Vehicle Code section
14104, which contemplates that the hearing be conducted in
a completely informal manner. The constitutionality of these
hearing procedures has been commented upon briefly in the
case of Hough v. McCarthy/8 and Beamon v. Department of
Motor Vehicles. 19
It is in this area that the chief importance of the Serenko
case lies, for that case decided that the person conducting
the hearings for the Department of Motor Vehicles pursuant to
Vehicle Code section 14107 need not be a hearing officer
possessing the same qualifications as a hearing officer contemplated by the Administrative Procedure Act. 20 In formal
hearings held by the Department of Motor Vehicles, the referee
hearing the matter for the department need not be a lawyer.
The court, among other things, noted a very salient distinction
between proceedings arising under the provisions of the
Vehicle Code, 1 and cases governed entirely by the Administrative Procedure Act. Among other things, section 14107
of the Vehicle Code provides that formal hearings may be
conducted by the director of that department, by a referee or
by a hearing board appointed by him consisting of officers
or employees of the department. Although the Vehicle Code
section 14112 provides that the Administrative Procedure Act
is applicable to those matters not covered by the Vehicle Code,
the court held that which of these three was to hear these
cases was determined by the Vehicle Code and hence, that
portion of the Administrative Procedure Act which defined
the qualifications of the hearing officer would not be applicable to these proceedings. The court pointed out something
else which is often times overlooked not only by practitioners
but by the courts. The inclusion of an agency in the list of
agencies under the Code 2 does not necessarily make the pro17. Cal. Vehicle Code § 14112.
18. 54 Ca1.2d 273, 5 Cal. Rptr. 668,
353 P.2d 276 (1960).
19. 180 Cal. App.2d 200, 4 Cal. Rptr.
396 (1960).

20. Cal. Government Code §§ 11500
et seq.
1. Cal. Vehicle Code §§ 1410014112.
2. Cal. Government Code § 11501
(b).

22
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visions of the Code applicable to those agencies therein listed.
Section 1 150 I of the Government Code expressly provides
that the procedure of any agency shall be conducted under
the provisions of the chapter (Administrative Procedure Act)
"only as to those functions relating to the particular agency."
In this connection, the cases of Bertch v. Social Welfare Department,3 and Taliaferro v. Insurance Commission,4 cited by
the court might well be read by those persons who are not
aware of the purpose of the listing of agencies under Code
section 11501(b).
It should be noted that most of the procedure at a formal
hearing is provided by the Administrative Procedure Act while
the informal hearing is governed by Vehicle Code section
14104. Whether the proceedings before the department will
be formal or informal is determined by the driver himself.
For when the driver makes the request for a hearing under
Vehicle Code section 13353, subdivision (c), he then indicates what kind of hearing he desires. Normally, the information supplied to him by the department indicates that if he
does not select a particular type of hearing, an informal hearing
will be given to him. The court, in the August case indicated
that the sworn statement of the peace officer may be used
as evidence in these informal hearings. The court in that
case concluded that the taking of oral testimony has not been
made a prerequisite to the validity of an informal hearing before the department in the absence of timely objection to the
admission of hearsay. The court pointed out the sworn statement could have the dignity of prima facie evidence in an informal hearing when received without objection and without
a request to cross-examine the peace officer making the statement. The court adhered to the rule established in Griswold
v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control,5 that the failure
to make an objection is deemed to be a waiver of objection,
3. 45 Cal.2d 524, 527, 289 P.2d
487 (1955).
4. 142 Cal. App.2d 487, 489,
P.2d 914, 916 (1956), cert. den.
U.S. 972, 1 L.Ed.2d 325, 77 S.Ct.
338
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and the court treated this as being a waiver of the objection
to the hearsay nature of the evidence.
It will be noted that Griswold involved a hearing under the
Administrative Procedure Act with all the trappings, and then
some, of a formal hearing. Thus, the question of the failure
to object would seem to be immaterial as to the type of
proceeding. The court seemed to reason in the August case
that the testimony of the licensee and that of his witness could
fill in the gaps to bring about the requisite evidentiary support
for the department's decision. The difficulty with August
is that while it attempts to explore various rights, procedural
and otherwise, with respect to the holdings of these hearings
and attempts to define rules governing the nature of the
evidence to be required, it seems to come up with no clear
application of such rules and with no full analysis of Vehicle
Code section 14104. On the facts of the case the court seems
to have arrived at the proper result. In passing it will also
be noted that this case, too, stands for the proposition that
what happens in the criminal action is unrelated to this
type of proceeding, a plea of guilty in the criminal matter not
vitiating the refusal in the implied consent case.
In Fallis, the court had before it an informal hearing. The
court concluded that the informal hearing process permitted
the department to treat the sworn statement as prima facie
evidence as to any matter in which there was no conflicting
evidence. The court, however, indicated that an arrest report and a supplemental report might not serve as evidence in
these cases. This holding is interesting because even in formal
hearings conducted under the Administrative Procedure Act,
hearsay is admissible. 6 Further, in light of the fact that under
section 14104, specific rules of evidence are laid down anyway;
so long as the matter is conducted in the purely informal
manner contemplated, there should have been no reason why
hearsay of a reliable type should not have been introduced,
used, and relied upon in such hearings.
In the Goss case, the court had before it the problem of a
formal hearing where the matter of hearsay was regulated
6. Cal. Government Code § l1S13(c).
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by Government Code section 11513. The court noted that
while the sworn statement and two police arrest reports were
all hearsay, they were admissible to supplement and explain
other admissible testimony. The court noted that the licensee
was called and his own testimony gave him away; hence, the
hearsay documents which the court mentioned were all competent to supplement and explain the driver's testimony pursuant to section 11513 (c).
During the period of time with which we deal there have
been other cases which the appellate courts have cited in this
implied consent field, but the the decisions in such cases have
been certified for non-publication. While some of these cases
represented well-established points, some have also presented
interesting extensions of many of the points established by the
cases commented upon here. It is a pity that the device of
certification for non-publication essentially deprives the practitioners of the benefit of those decisions. Especially is this
critical to the administrative agency that would like to rely on
those cases but cannot cite them in court.
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

In commenting on Eye Dog Foundation v. State Board of
Guide Dogs for the Blind, supra, we have already had occasion
to note the general subject of exhaustion of administrative
remedies as commented on by the courts throughout the year.
The courts still state the general proposition that where an
administrative remedy is provided by this statute, relief must
be sought from the administrative body and this remedy exhausted before the court will act. Compliance with this rule
is a jurisdictional prerequisite to resort to the courts. 7 The
case of Hollon v. Pierce,s presented an interesting application
of the doctrine. In that case the petitioner sought to compeJ
reinstatement by his employer, the Shasta Union High School
District. He alleged that the district had discharged him
7. McLeod v. City of Los Angeles,
256 Cal. App.2d 693, 64 Cal. Rptr.
394 (1967).
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because of his religious beliefs. The school district, after
some allegedly unstable behavior by the petitioner, held an
executive session and adopted a resolution withholding renewal
of the petitioner's contract for the forthcoming school year.
They did, however, offer to review any psychiatric examination
he might obtain. The petitioner then filed a complaint with
the State Fair Employment Practices Commission9 which conducted an examination. The Commission received two
psychiatric reports, neither of them indicating petitioner to
be maladjusted, disoriented, psychotic, or dangerous. The
evidence before the appellate court indicated that as time went
on the State Fair Employment Practices Commission seemed
to have dropped the matter.
The court indicated that a statute investing a public agency
with supervisory or investigatory power affords an administrative remedy when it establishes clearly defined machinery
for the submission, evaluation, and resolution of complaints
by aggrieved parties. In this connection, the remedy before
the State Fair Employment Practices Commission was deemed
to be an administrative remedy within the rule and one which
petitioner had to exhaust before seeking judicial review.
Thus, the case stands for the proposition that the administrative remedy may very well be one which is afforded by some
administrative agency wholly outside of the contemplated
machinery involving the agency whose acts are in question.
The court in Hol/on, however, avoided any real problem in
the case by holding that there had been an exhaustion of the
remedy before the Fair Employment Practices Commission
because, although the proceedings before the commission did
not reach the point of completion by rejection of the complaint, or rendition of a final order, it did come to a complete
halt. The administrative machinery had stopped, and the
court reasoned that theoretically the complaining employee
might have brought a mandate action with the objective of
compelling the commission to act further. Such a lawsuit
would have been expensive and would have entailed delay;
thus, the court reasoned that the rule of resort to the adminis9. Cal. Labor Code § 1414.
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trative agency only demanded exhaustion of the remedies not
the attrition of the litigant.
The courts also continued to hold that the court will not
consider for the first time on judicial review points not presented to the agency. Thus where a petition for reconsideration is available in a Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board
proceeding, the court will not consider for the first time points
not presented in the applicant's petition for reconsideration. 10
The rule would be somewhat modified with regard to cases
involving agencies governed by the Administrative Procedure
Act because Government Code section 11523 expressly provides that a petition for reconsideration is not a condition
precedent to seeking judicial review. However, even as to
those agencies which operate under the Administrative Procedure Act, the courts have still indicated their disenchantment
with litigants who do not present those points for consideration
to the agency where there is that kind of availability.ll
In Reimel v. House,t2 the court expressed its displeasure with
a decision of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board,
a board to which appeals from decisions of the Department
of Alcoholic Beverage Control are taken. In that case, the
appeals board decided an issue neither presented at the hearing before the department nor even presented in the appeal
before the appeals board. The court held that since the issue
was not properly raised at the hearing before the department,
it was not before the board. This is another application of the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies used in a
setting where an administrative tribunal is used as an appellate
body over another administrative tribunal.
Public Employees and Administrative Law

During the year a number of cases involving public employees at all levels-city, county, and state-have been de10. Heath v. Workmen's Camp. App.
Bd., 254 Cal. App.2d 235, 62 Cal. Rptr.
139 (1967).
11. Reimel v. ABC Appeals Board,
256 Cal. App.2d 158, 175, 64 Cal. Rptr.
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26,35-36 (1967), app. dismd. 393 U.S.
7, 21 L.Ed.2d 9, 89 S.O. 44.
12. 259 Cal. App.2d 511, 66 Cal.
Rptr. 434 (1968), app. dismd. 393 U.S.
17, 21 L.Ed.2d 17, 89 S.O. 48.
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cided. The court in Hofberg v. County of Los Angeles Civil
Service,13 restated the rule concerning public employment that
although it is not a constitutional right, one cannot be properly barred from public employment for arbitrary, unreasonable, and capricious reasons. The court in Hofberg showed
its unwillingness to impose conditions of employment which
improperly impair the exercise of basic constitutional rights.
In proceeding along these lines, the court was dealing with a
petitioner who had sometime previously been discharged from
county employment because he asserted the Fifth Amendment
privilege in an appearance before the House of Representatives' Committee on Un-American Activities. Subsequently,
and at a date closer to the institution of the proceedings, the
employee sought employment by the agency, disclosed the
particulars of his prior employment and reasons for discharge,
and passed a written examination. His name was withheld
from the eligible lists, however, under a rule which stated that
an applicant's name might be withheld from the employment
list if that person had been dismissed for cause.
In appealing this decision, the petitioner indicated his willingness to answer any questions asked by the County of Los
Angeles or the Civil Service Commission which he had previously refused to answer before the House Un-American
Activities Committee. He further indicated that in response
to a request that if called upon he would appear before the
HUAC but that on advice of counsel, predicated on Fifth
Amendment grounds, he would refuse to answer any questions
except those set out in Government Code section 1028.1 (relating to subversive activities). He added, however, that he
would appear before any State Assembly Committee or Senate
Committee and answer any questions. The court noted the
expansion of constitutional rights of public employees over the
years and the corresponding restrictions on the conditions
which could be imposed on employment and concluded there
was no substantial element of utility to support the Civil
Service Commission's decision in denying reemployment. The
13. 258 Cal. App.2d 433, 65 Cal.
Rptr. 759 (1968). For further discus-
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court stressed petitioner's willingness to answer any questions
by any local or state body and his willingness, except with the
limitation here noted, to questions posed by the HUAC. The
only refusal present was related to a possible future refusal
to answer some unknown questions at a hypothetical hearing.
In Board of Trustees of the Placerville Union School District
v. Porini,14 the court held that in an action to dismiss a school
teacher as being mentally incompetent, the judgment supporting a requirement that the teacher take a two-year leave
of absence was unsupported where all the evidence of incompetence related to a time period sixteen months prior to
the date of trial, and no evidence showed that she suffered any
incapacity at the time of trial and where there was some evidence produced by the teacher to the contrary.
In Orlandi v. State Personnel Board,15 a traffic officer was
dismissed under Government Code section 19572, subdivision
(t) (failure of good behavior of such nature that it causes discredit to the employee's agency or his employment). The
dismissal, which arose out of the officer's fixing of a traffic
ticket, was upheld although there was no actual proof presented that the crime actually resulted in damage to the reputation of the California Highway Patrol, and although there
was no showing that the conduct was publicized. The statutory provision dealt with conduct of state employees and not
with the extent of publicity that the conduct may attract. The
officer's conduct was clearly the sort of behavior which would
discredit the highway patrol and bring discredit to its officers.
Licensing-Nature of Licenses and Effect of Nonlicensing

In Johnson v. Maddox,16 the court held that where a license
is required by statute before a certain activity, such as con14. 263 Cal. App.2d 784, 70 Cal.
Rptr. 73 (1968). For a further discussion of this case, see McKinstry, STATE
AND
LOCAL
GOVERNMENT,
in this
volume.
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15. 263 Cal. App.2d 32, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 177 (1968).
16. Johnson v. Maddox, 257 Cal.
App.2d 714, 65 Cal. Rptr. 185 (1968).
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tracting, may be engaged in, an unlicensed person who contracts to do that for which a license is required may not
recover on his contract. This case presented nothing particularly new, but the federal courts in Power City Communications Inc. v. Calaveras Telephone Co./ 7 provided an interesting twist on the application of the rule. In that case the
district court held that in view of the rule in Erie Railroad Co.
v. Tompkins,18 the California statute prohibiting a contractor
from bringing and maintaining an action to collect compensation for any act or contract for which a license is required
without alleging and proving that it was a duly licensed contractor was determinative as to whether or not a Washington
corporation was empowered to sue in a diversity action for installation and construction of telephone facilities in California. This California rule was the one to be followed rather
than the usual federal rule providing that the capacity of a
corporation to sue or be sued is to be determined by the law
under which it was organized.
17. 280 F.Supp. 808 (D.C. [1968]).

18. 304 U.S. 64, 82 L.Ed. 1188, 58
S.C!. 817, 114 A.L.R. 1487 (1938).
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